Associative False Consumer Memory: Effects of Need for Cognition & Encoding Task by Parker, A & Dagnall, N
Parker, A and Dagnall, N (2017)Associative False Consumer Memory: Ef-
fects of Need for Cognition & Encoding Task. Memory. ISSN 0965-8211
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/619162/
Version: Accepted Version
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2017.1381745
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           1 
 
 
 
 
 
Running Head: ASSOCIATIVE FALSE CONSUMER MEMORY 
 
Associative False Consumer Memory: Effects of Need for Cognition 
& Encoding Task. 
 
Andrew Parker* & Neil Dagnall 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
Department of Psychology 
53 Bonsall Street 
Manchester 
M15 6GX 
United Kingdom 
 
 
* To whom correspondence should be addressed 
e-mail: a.parker@mmu.ac.uk 
Telephone: 0161 247 2586 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank Matt Noon, Charlotte Dowd, Andrew Thomas and 
Aaron Findley for assistance with the collection of data for the experiments reported 
here.   
 
Note: This is the final 
version of the authors copy. 
Subtle difference may exist 
between this and the final 
published version in the 
journal “Memory”. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Two experiments investigated the effects of product attribute associations on false 
consumer memory. In both experiments, subjects were presented with sets of related 
product attributes under incidental encoding conditions. Later, recognition memory 
was tested with studied attributes, non-studied but associated attributes (critical lures) 
and non-studied unrelated attributes. In Experiment 1, the effect of Need for 
Cognition (NFC) was assessed. It was found that individuals high in NFC recognised 
more presented attributes and falsely recognised more associative critical lures. The 
increase in both true and associative false memory was accompanied by a greater 
number of responses that index the retrieval of detailed episodic-like information. 
Experiment 2, replicated the main findings through an experimental manipulation of 
the encoding task that required subjects to consider purchase likelihood. Explanations 
for these findings are considered from the perspective of activation processes and 
knowledge structures in the form of gist-based representations.        
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Associative False Consumer Memory: Effects of Need for Cognition  
& Encoding Task. 
The importance of associative representations and processes has had a long 
and venerable history in the psychology of learning and memory, from associationism 
to mathematical and computation models of memory (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973; 
Lohnas, Polyn, & Kahana, 2015; Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998). The 
processing of associative information in memory can also lead to memory errors 
(Roediger et al., 1998). One type of error is that of commission and involves 
incorrectly recalling or recognising non-presented items (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; 
Schacter 1999). The focus of the current experiments was the false recognition of 
consumer information, factors influencing such false memories, and the 
phenomenological characteristics of these memory errors. To this end, the 
introduction provides an overview of relevant associative false memory research prior 
to considering the implications of this for consumer memory.  
Associative processing & false memory  
One experimental method for creating associative false memories is the 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). This involves the presentation of a list of associated words (e.g., hot, snow, 
warm, winter, ice) that are related to a non-presented item, often called the critical 
lure or theme word; in this example, the word is cold. A typical outcome is that 
subjects falsely recall or recognize the critical lure, often at levels equivalent to 
studied words (e.g., Gallo, Roediger & McDermott, 2001; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995; Thapar & McDermott, 2001).  
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Associative false memories can also arise in other paradigms that capitalise on 
pre-existing taxonomic categories. In the category-repetition paradigm, subjects are 
exposed to sets of exemplars from a particular category of which some have been 
omitted (e.g., mango, pear, cherry, strawberry). False memories arise when subjects 
claim to have studied dominant but non-presented exemplars, such as apple or orange 
(e.g., Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999; Dewhurst & Farrand, 2004; Seamon, Luo, 
Schlegel, Greene, & Goldenberg, 2000; Smith, Gerkens, Pierce, & Choi, 2002).  
More generally, these associative memory errors have led to a range of 
experimental work that demonstrates the factors that produce such errors and the 
importance of associative processing in false memory more generally (Gallo, & 
Lampinen, 2015). Although the precise nature of the stimulus relationships within 
each of these paradigms might differ, they both illustrate the importance of 
associative information in the creation of false memory effects. Consequently, in both 
paradigms, false memories arise because of pre-existing associations between the 
non-presented lures and the studied information. Associative information is also 
important for understanding consumer memory, as outlined later. 
The role of associative representations and processing is acknowledged by two 
prominent explanations for false memory effects. One account, the activation-
monitoring framework (Gallo, 2010; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), explains false 
memories arising as a result of list words activating the critical lure during encoding. 
Thus, during the study of items that are related by virtue of backward associative 
strength or taxonomic category, the non-presented critical lure is activated. 
Subsequently, during testing, differentiating between presented (vs. non-presented 
items) is particularly difficult because of the similarity of activation levels. This can 
then result in a monitoring failure and the creation of a false memory.  
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Another explanation, Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT), differentiates between the 
types of memory representations created during encoding (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). 
One of these, called the verbatim trace, represents an accurate record of the encoded 
experience and contains detailed episodic information about the study experience. The 
second, called the gist trace, represents the more general features or attributes of the 
encoded experience. Typically, the gist representation leads to memory responses that 
are devoid of particular details that form part of the verbatim trace. During testing, 
false memories can arise when the gist trace is used as a basis for responding to 
associated, but non-studied items.   
Associative processing & consumer memory  
Consumer memory refers to the sum total of the contents of information about 
products and brands, including marketing information (i.e., ad-claims, brand messages 
and visuals) and consumer generated information in the form of cognitive and 
emotional responses (Aaker, 1991; Bagozzi, Gürnao-Canli & Priester, 2002; Braun-
LaTour, & LaTour, 2004). Thus, the content of consumer memory is not limited to 
those properties provided by marketers. This content is stored within consumers’ 
long-term memory and can provide a basis for product/brand evaluation and choice 
(Alba, Hutchinson & Lynch, 1991; Hilbig, 2014; Lee, 2002). Many theoretical 
accounts of consumer memory represent brand and product category information in 
terms of associative networks (Bettman, Johnson & Payne, 1991; Schmitt, 2012; 
Teichert, & Schöntag, 2010). Processing mechanisms work within these 
representations to activate brand and product associations together with other pre-
stored information, such as prior cognitive responses and evaluations. Ultimately, 
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these shape the consumers’ understanding of brand and product information and can 
influence consumer decisions (Alba, et al., 1991; Bettman et al., 1991). 
In this context, prior knowledge enables the consumer to fill in the gaps 
between presented (e.g., advertised) and non-presented (e.g., non-advertised) 
information (e.g., Kardes, Posavac, & Cronley, 2004). If the consumer retrieves 
attributes consistent with the product category, but not necessarily the brand or the 
marketing claims, the evaluation of that brand may be biased. Consequently, 
understanding the attributes activated by product categories is of importance.       
Experiment 1. The effects of Need for Cognition on consumer false memory 
Need for Cognition (NFC) refers to a trait-like tendency for individuals to 
engage with and enjoy systematic and effortful processing of information (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Thus, individuals differ in the extent to which they 
are motivated to utilise cognitive resources in tasks that require attention, or are 
demanding. Typically, processing differences are assessed by comparing individuals 
who score high (vs. low) on the NFC scale. Across a range of tasks and situations, 
variations between high and low NFC individuals have been found in relation to: (i) 
Evaluating the cogency and quality of persuasive arguments (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Morris, 1983; Priester & Petty, 1995). For example, those high in NFC are more 
persuaded by strong (vs. weak arguments) and show greater attitudinal shifts in 
response to the former; (ii) Assessing the value of beliefs about products, with those 
high in NFC possessing more confidence in the validity of self-generated cognitive 
responses (Petty, Briñol, & Tormala, 2002); (iii) Engaging in deeper processing, with 
those higher in NFC scrutinising and making use of semantic strategies when reading 
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texts (Kardash & Noel, 2000); (iv) Forming inferences and conclusions based on 
limited information. For instance, those high in NFC are more likely to infer that a 
product possesses a particular attribute when that attribute is not advertised explicitly 
(Martin, Lang, & Wong, 2003; Stayman & Kardes, 1992); (v) Showing differences in 
the degree of transfer of skills based on working memory training, due to the higher 
intrinsic motivation of high NFC subjects (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Shah & Jonides, 
2014), and (vi) Memory retrieval, with high NFC subjects showing enhanced free 
recall of a set of persuasive arguments (e.g., Cacioppo, et al., 1983).  
Need for cognition has been particularly useful for understanding individual 
differences in consumer settings persuasion (Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). In 
this context, NFC has been valuable for examining the effect of motivation on 
cognition and other consumer relevant variables such as attitudes, product 
evaluations, and brand-related behavior (e.g., Haugtvedt et al., 1992; Hanson, 
Samuelsen, & Sallis, 2013; Martin, et al., 2004)  
A general explanation for the range of effects found using NFC has been 
conceptualised in the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 
1986). The ELM differentiates between central and peripheral processing routes. The 
former involves effortful processing based on the scrutiny, amplification and reasoned 
consideration of information. Elaboration itself can take a number of forms, including 
sheer amount (e.g., the quantity or number of thoughts generated to a stimulus), 
relevance (e.g., the significance or bearing of the generated cognitions in relation to 
the stimulus), or complexity, (e.g., generating more multifaceted cognitions making 
use of multiple cues) (Cacioppo, et al., 1996). Together, these cognitive responses 
(Petty, Ostrom & Brock, 1981) determine the behavioural outcome to persuasion 
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attempts (Petty, & Cacioppo, 1986), marketing communications (e.g., Briñol, et al., 
2004), and reactions to other verbal and visual stimuli (e.g., Fleischhauer, Miller, 
Enge, & Albrecht, 2014; Kardash, & Noel, 2000). In contrast, the peripheral route 
involves processing that is less cognitively demanding and may engage the use of 
decision heuristics and attention to simple peripheral cues. In such instances, the 
outcomes of persuasion attempts would be determined by factors such as the expertise 
or attractiveness of the communicator (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981), or 
mere consideration of the brand name (e.g., Maheswaran, Mackie, & Chaiken, 1992). 
Across these examples, attitude change comes about because of processing of 
incidental or secondary features of the communication as opposed to content or 
cogency of the actual message. 
In the context of this model, NFC is considered to be a motivational variable 
in which those scoring higher on this scale are driven to engage in effortful thinking 
across a range of situations and materials. The consequence of this is enhanced 
message elaboration in terms of quantity, relevance and complexity. 
Within this framework it is constructive to consider the effects of NFC on 
false memory. For example, Graham (2007) found that subjects who were high in 
NFC were more likely to falsely recognise non-presented DRM critical lures. This did 
not extend to unassociated lures or true memory. More recently, Leding (2011), 
extended these findings to free recall. Particularly, over a multi-trial free recall 
sequence, the false recall of critical lures and true recall of studied items were reliably 
enhanced in high NFC subjects, especially under full (vs. divided) attention 
conditions. 
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False memories can also be observed with more consumer oriented stimuli. In 
particular Sherman (2013) found that consumers displayed false memories for non-
presented brand names following exposure to associated brand names in a similar 
product class. This was observed for both recall and recognition with greater false 
memory effects after a delay. Similar results were also found following exposure to 
television advertisements (Sherman, Follows, Mushore, Hampson-Jones, & Wright-
Bevans, 2015). However, in neither of these experiments was NFC assessed or 
incorporated as a variable.  
 Consequently, Experiment 1 assessed the influence of NFC on associative 
false memory with consumer relevant stimuli. However, rather than assessing 
memory for brand names, product class attributes were chosen as a means to explore 
associative memory in consumers. A product class refers to a set of interrelated 
products/brands that share similar functions and can mediate a range of consumer 
related cognitions and behaviours (e.g., Brucks, 1985; Chang, 2004; Rao, & Monroe, 
1988). In the experiments reported here, examples of product classes included cereals 
and toothpastes, whilst product attributes were the associations generated in response 
to the product class names (e.g., whitening and fluoride for toothpaste and crunch and 
fibre for cereal). In both experiments, participants were exposed to sets of various 
product category associations. For each category, the two attributes with the highest 
typicality rating to the product class were omitted to form the critical lures for those 
products (e.g., minty and breakfast). Memory for studied and unstudied attributes was 
assessed as a function of NFC (Experiment 1) and encoding task (Experiment 2). 
 In addition to measuring overall recognition, the remember-know procedure 
(Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000), was employed to assess memory for 
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recollective details (Remember responses) and item familiarity (Know responses). 
This was done to provide insight into the qualitative characteristics of true and false 
consumer memory as related to NFC and encoding task. 
It was predicted that false memory for critical lures from presented lists would 
be higher than that for unassociated lures or critical lures from non-presented lists. 
More interestingly, it was expected that false memory would be higher for 
participants high in NFC. It was also hypothesised that those high in NFC would 
show superior true recognition. This prediction may seem at odds with the results of 
Graham (2007) who found no effect of NFC on recognition of studied items. 
However, given that (i) much existing work shows effects of elaborative or deeper 
processing on recognition (as well as recall) (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975; Gardiner, 
1988; Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; Rajaram, 1993; Thapar & 
McDermott, 2001), and, (ii) variation in NFC is conceptualised as producing 
differences in elaborative encoding (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986; Cacioppo, et al., 
1996; Wootan & Leding, 2015), then this prediction seemed warranted from a general 
perspective. In addition, use of the remember-know procedure, would also confer 
some benefits to the assessment of recognition memory responses. This is because 
effects that are obscured by the analysis of only the overall hit rate, might be revealed 
by finer-grained analyses involving ‘remember’ and ‘know’ responses (Gardiner & 
Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). Consequently, the null effect of NFC on true recognition, 
as found by Graham (2007), might pertain only to the overall recognition responses.   
Experiment 1: Method 
 Design 
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The overall design was a 2(NFC; high vs. low) between-subjects by 4(attribute 
type; studied list attributes vs. critical lures from studied lists vs. non-studied list 
attributes from the unexposed lists vs. critical lures from the unexposed lists) within-
subjects mixed ANOVA. 
The dependent variables were yes responses to each of the types of attributes 
outlined above. Each of these were further analysed in terms of ‘Remember’, and 
‘Know’ responses. Additional variables were: (i) signal detection measures of 
sensitivity (d’) and response bias (β) (ii) process-independence measures of 
recollection and familiarity (derived from the ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses and 
described in the results section). 
 Participants 
For the main experiment, 70 volunteers from the undergraduate population of 
the Manchester Metropolitan University were recruited by the experimenters and 
assistants. Two of these were excluded from analyses for failure to complete the 
recognition test. An additional 46 student participants from the same university 
assisted with the development of the stimulus materials. None of these took part in the 
main experiments. 
Materials & Apparatus 
General Construction of Product Category Lists 
The development of the product category-attribute lists were constructed for 
the purpose of both experiments reported here. Stimulus development consisted of a 
number of stages1. Firstly, thirty-five product categories (e.g., toothpaste, soup, soap) 
were generated by the authors. These categories were then placed into a booklet with 
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several spaces below each for written responses. A group of 20 participants were then 
asked to generate as many attributes/characteristics that came to mind that they 
considered being associated with that product. They were told to avoid just generating 
brand names and an example was provided.  
The attributes generated were then collated to a general pool of attributes for 
each category. From this pool, a total of 30 categories were then selected along with 
12 attributes per category. The attributes selected were those that were most 
commonly produced. 
The category names were then placed into a booklet with the name of one of 
each the categories printed at the top of each page. Below this, the selected 12 
attributes for that category were each placed above a 7 point Likert rating scale with 
the scale anchors being very uncharacteristic (1) to very characteristic (7). 
This booklet was then given out to 26 participants under the guise of a 
consumer survey. The participants were informed that that they would be asked to 
consider a number of everyday products and for each rate how characteristic they 
believed to be a range of attributes pertaining to that product. An example was 
provided that was not used in the survey itself. 
Following this, the mean rating for each attribute for each category was 
calculated. On the basis of this, a total of 8 attributes per category were selected. The 
attributes selected were those with the highest ratings. From this initial pool, a total of 
20 categories were chosen for inclusion in the main experiments. For each of the 
chosen categories, the two most characteristic or typical attributes were selected to be 
the non-presented critical lures. These were the attributes that were most strongly 
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associated to the product category name. The remaining six attributes were used as 
presented (studied) items. For example, for the product category ‘Washing 
Detergent’, the critical lures were Clean and Laundry, and the list attributes were; 
Biological, Powder, Softening, Conditioning, Linen, and Colour care. 
Construction of the Encoding Sets 
The 20 selected product categories were divided into two sets (A and B) for 
the purpose of counterbalancing. Participants were only exposed to one set during the 
study phase. The alternative set was used to form distracters on the recognition test. 
For the purposes of presentation, two auditory lists were created from set A and B. 
Each of these lists comprised ten product names and six attributes. Each category was 
spoken by a female voice with the name of the product mentioned first followed by 
the six attributes in descending order of association.  
Construction of the Recognition Tests 
The recognition tests were constructed from encoding sets A and B by the 
selection of a total of 80 attributes as follows. Firstly, two attributes from the middle 
of each list for each of the categories. For each subject, 20 of these were studied and 
20 unstudied list attributes. Secondly, the critical non-presented attributes from the 
presented category (20 in total), and the two critical attributes from the non-presented 
category (20 in total). The reason two items were selected as critical lures from each 
list was to balance the proportion of list and related attributes from each of the 
product sets and to ensure a reasonably wise range of responses for each item-type. In 
other research making use of the DRM procedure, often only one critical lure is used. 
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However, previous work has also followed the procedure used here (e.g., Dewhurst et 
al., 2005; Knott & Dewhurst, 2007). 
The words were randomly arranged and printed down the left side of a test 
booklet. To the right of each word were the response options ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. To the 
right of these response options were the words ‘Remember’, ‘Know’ and ‘Guess’.  
The front cover of the test booklet provided participants with the details of the 
recognition test and the remember-know instructions (see procedure section for more 
information).  
Other Materials: Need for Cognition 
Need for Cognition was measured by the revised 18 item NFC scale 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Each item on the questionnaire consisted of a 
statement that assesses the degree to which the respondent expresses a preference for 
engaging in effortful thought. Each statement is paired with a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Previous research has 
documented this scale to be reliable (e.g., Cacioppo et al. 1996) and the Cronbach’s 
alpha for the current study was .92. 
 Apparatus 
A computer was used to present the stimuli during the encoding phase. Word 
lists were recorded onto a set of audio files. 
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a sound attenuated booth. 
Following the initial overview of the experiment and the signing of the consent forms 
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the experiment began. Participants were informed that the experiment would consist 
of a number of phases but they were not given any details about the phases. 
In the encoding phase, participants were randomly assigned to either encoding 
set A or B and informed that they were about to listen to a set of product categories 
and attributes that they might think about on an everyday basis or during a  trip to the 
supermarket. Each set was spoken by a female voice with the name of the category 
presented first followed by the product attributes. A 1 s interval was interposed 
between each word and a 2.5 s interval was used between each category.  
After the encoding phase, the participant took part in an unrelated task for 
seven minutes; this comprised writing down the names of towns and cities in the 
United Kingdom. In the recognition test phase, participants were presented with a 
recognition booklet and asked to read the instructions printed on the front cover. The 
instructions indicated that a number of words were printed in the booklet of which 
only some were presented earlier. The task of the participant was to indicate for each 
word if they recognized the word by circling ‘yes’ or ‘no’. If ‘no’ was circled, they 
were informed to move onto the next word. If they claimed to recognized the word 
they were asked to indicate how they recognized it based on remember-know 
instructions adapted from Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn (2000). In these 
instructions, a remember response was defined as one which is associated conscious 
recollection of the studied attribute. A know response was defined as one in which the 
attribute is recognised because it seems familiar within the confines of the study but 
lacks more distinctive or recollective details. A guess response was indicated as one 
where they felt they were simply presuming the study status of the attribute and was 
neither associated with recollection or familiarity. The experimenter ensured that the 
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participants understood the instructions and were then asked to turn the page and 
complete the self-paced test. The NFC scale was completed ether prior to the 
encoding phase or after the test and was counterbalanced. 
Results 
Overview 
The results are organised by the type of analysis performed. Initially, an 
analysis on the overall proportion of yes responses to the different attributes was 
performed as a function of NFC. This produced a 2(NFC; high vs. low) between-
subjects by 4(attribute type; studied vs. critical lure of studied vs. non-studied vs. 
critical lure of non-studied) within-subjects mixed ANOVA. The NFC grouping was 
achieved by following the procedure in previous work (e.g., Cacioppo, et al., 1983; 
Graham, 2007; Leding, 2011; 2013) and involved a median split. The median in this 
study was 61.5 and similar to previous work (e.g., Graham, 2007; Leding, 2011). This 
produced 34 participants in each of the groups. This initial ANOVA permitted an 
assessment of the overall effects of NFC on true and false memory. Combining the 
types of attributes into one analysis allowed an examination of the comparative 
magnitude of true and false memory. Secondly, signal detection analyses were 
performed to examine recognition sensitivity (d’) and response bias (β) as a function 
of NFC and type of memory (true vs. false).  
The ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses were analysed as both raw proportion 
scores and as transformed scores forming process estimates of recollection and 
familiarity. The raw proportion values for ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ are only valid 
estimates of underlying processes if those processes operate in a mutually exclusive 
manner (e.g., Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1996; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
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1995).  However, according to certain dual-process frameworks, the underlying 
processes of recollection and familiarity operate independently of each other (e.g., 
Jacoby, 1998; Jacoby, Begg & Toth, 1997; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1995). If correct, this makes the use of raw proportion scores problematic and 
produces biased estimates of recollection and, especially familiarity. Essentially, the 
proportion of ‘Know’ responses underestimates the magnitude of familiarity as 
participants only use a ’Know’ response when recollection fails; represented 
algebraically as K = F(1 - R), where K equals the proportion of ‘Know’ responses, F 
represents familiarity and R represents recollection.  
Through the rearrangement of this formula it is possible to calculate 
familiarity according to the assumption of process independence. Consequently, 
Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) advocate calculating familiarity by the formula F = 
K/(1-R). However, a potential problem with this equation is that it does not take into 
account the fact that a ‘guess’ option was used in the current experiments. If the 
proportion of guess responses is very low (as is the case with the present 
experiments), then this need not pose any difficulties. In spite of this, an alternative is 
to incorporate the guess responses into the analyses. One way to do this is to 
recognise that ‘know’ responses, are considered to vary on a continuum of trace or 
confidence strength (e.g., Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Ranganath, 2010; 
Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010). Consequently, one interpretation of ‘guess’ 
responses is they represent very low confidence ‘know’ responses and that a ‘know’ 
response would likely have been given if no guess option were available (Knott & 
Dewhurst, 2007; Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi, 2012; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). In the 2-
step recognition procedure used here, RKG responses are made following the decision 
that an item is old. Thus, it makes sense that such guesses are not without any 
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evidential (mnemonic) basis; that is, they are not simply ‘wild’ guesses. Rather, they 
represent very low confidence responses. Given this, the calculation of process 
familiarity was derived by combining the proportions of ‘know’ and ‘guess’ prior to 
dividing by the denominator, 1-R. 
The assessment of the process of recollection is less problematic than 
familiarity and can be calculated by subtraction of the remember responses to non-
studied items from remember responses to studied items. For completeness, both 
proportion and process-based estimates are included in the results. 
Overall proportion yes responses. 
The proportion of yes responses to each type of attribute were entered into a 
2(NFC; high vs. low) between-subjects by 4(attribute type; studied vs. critical lure of 
studied vs. non-studied vs. critical lure of non-studied) within-subjects mixed 
ANOVA. The descriptive statistics for these and all other analyses for this experiment 
can be found in Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
This revealed a main effect of attribute type, F(3, 198) = 126.55, p < .001, p 
= .66. Inspection of the means shows the lowest number of yes responses for non-
studied items with critical lures in between studied and non-studied. The main effect 
of NFC was significant, F(1, 66) = 6.87, p = .01, p = .09, showing higher proportion 
scores for the high NFC group. The interaction was also significant, F(3, 198) =  7.16, 
p < .001, p = .09. The interaction was assessed further by the use of simple main 
effects at each level of attribute type. For studied attributes this produced a significant 
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difference between high and low NFC groups t(66) = 3.77, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.91, showing higher true recognition scores for the high group. For critical false 
memory, the difference was also significant, t(66) = 2.29, p = .02, Cohen’s d = 0.51, 
again showing higher false recognition scores for the high NFC group. The difference 
between the non-studied attributes was not significant, for either of the attribute types 
p’s > .05.  
Signal detection analyses 
The signal detection measure of sensitivity (d’) for true memory was 
calculated by using the hit and false alarm rates for studied and non-studied attributes 
respectively. In relation to false memory, d’ was calculated by treating the proportion 
of yes responses to critical lures from studied lists as hits and proportion yes 
responses to critical lures from unstudied lists as false alarms. For false memory, d’ 
shows the extent to which subjects falsely recognise critical attributes associated with 
studied lists compared to similar attributes from non-studied lists. Higher scores show 
greater discrimination between the two types of attribute. In previous research this has 
been referred to as a measure of gist-based memory (e.g., Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 
1999), as higher scores show responses that are more influenced by the gist or theme 
of the list.    
These scores were entered into a 2(NFC; high vs. low) between-subjects by 
2(memory type; true vs. false) within-subjects mixed ANOVA. This produced a 
significant main effect of attribute type F(1, 66) = 59.30, p < . 001, p = .47, showing 
higher d’ scores for true memory. The main effect of NFC was also significant F(1, 
66) = 11.63, p = .001, p = .15, revealing higher d’ scores for those high in NFC. The 
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interaction was not significant, F(1, 66) = .97, p = .33, p = .01. These results show 
that the ability to differentiate between attribute type was higher for true compared to 
false memory and higher for those high in the NFC. 
Response bias β was calculated using the same item types as for d’. The raw 
scores were skewed and the analyses were based on log transformed scores. These 
were placed into a 2(NFC; high vs. low) between-subjects by 2(memory type; true vs. 
false) within-subjects mixed ANOVA. This produced a main effect of memory type, 
F(1, 66) = 8.83, p = .004, p = .12, showing a more liberal response tendency for 
false memory. There was no main effect of NFC, F(1, 66) = 0.34, p = .56, p = .005, 
and no interaction, F(1, 66) = 2.00, p = .03.     
Proportion analyses for RKG responses 
The proportion responses for ‘Remember’, and ‘Know’ responses were 
entered into two separate 2(NFC; high vs. low) between-subjects by 4(attribute type; 
studied vs. critical lure of studied vs. non-studied vs. critical lure of non-studied) 
within-subjects mixed ANOVAs.  
For ‘Remember’ responses this produced a significant main effect of attribute 
type, F(3, 198) = 81.88, p < .001, p = .55, showing the fewest remember responses 
for non-studied attributes. The proportion of remember responses for critical attributes 
was between those for studied and non-studied items. The main effect for NFC was 
significant, F(1, 66) = 13.48, p < .001, p = .17, with more ‘Remember’ responses 
for those high in NFC. The interaction was also significant, F(3, 198) = 10.19, p < 
.001, p = .13. The interaction was assessed by simple main effects analyses by 
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comparing high with low NFC subjects at each level of attribute type. This indicated a 
significant difference between levels of NFC for both presented and critical attributes, 
t(66) = 4.25, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.02, and, t(66) = 2.79, p = .007, Cohen’s d = 
0.68, for studied and critical attributes respectively. In both comparisons, the 
proportion of ‘Remember’ responses were higher for the high NFC group. The 
difference between the non-studied attributes was not significant, for either of the 
attribute types p’s > .05.  
For ‘Know’ responses, the main effect of attribute type was significant, F(3, 
198) = 35.39, p < .001, p = .35. The main effect of NFC was not significant, F(1, 
66) = 0.97, p = .33,p = .14 The interaction was not significant, F(3, 198) = .09, p = 
.96, p = .001. The main effect of attribute type was examined by comparing 
‘equivalent’ attributes. This involved, firstly, a comparison of responses to list 
attributes from studied lists with those to list attributes from unstudied lists, and 
secondly, a comparison of responses to critical lures from studied lists with those to 
critical lures from unstudied lists. For both comparisons, the effects were significant, 
t(67) = 7.75, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.04, for list attributes and t(67) = 6.47, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.82, for lures respectively. In both comparisons, the mean for the 
studied and lure from the studied list was higher.  
The proportion of ‘Guess’ responses were not subject to analyses because 
these responses are restricted by the magnitude of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ 
responses; consequently, they are not independent of these values. However, the 
descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1, and shows the overall proportion of 
guesses to be very low.  
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Process estimates for recollection & familiarity
 Process estimates for recollection were placed into a 2(memory type; true vs. 
false) within-subjects by 2(NFC; high vs. low) between-subjects mixed ANOVA. The 
findings indicated a main effect of memory type, F(1, 66) = 48.66, p < .001, p = .42, 
showing greater recollection estimates for true memory. The main effect of NFC was 
significant, F(1, 66) = 15.46, p < .001, p = .19, showing greater recollection 
estimates for those high in NFC. The interaction was also significant, F(1, 66) = 4.15, 
p = .04, p = .05. The interaction was assessed by the use of simple main effects that 
compared high with low NFC groups at each level of memory type. This produced a 
significant difference between high and low groups for both true (t(66) = 4.25, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.04) and false (t(66) = 2.45, p < .02, Cohen’s d = 0.62) 
recollection. The magnitude of the difference was larger for true recollection.  
 Process estimates for familiarity were assessed by a similar ANOVA to 
recollection. This produced a main effect of memory type, F(1, 66), = 19.71, p < 
.001,p = .23 with higher familiarity estimates for true memory. The main effect of 
NFC was not significant, F(1, 66) = 2.03, p = .16,p = .03. Finally, the interaction 
was not significant, F(1, 66) = 0.23, p = .63, p = .003. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 succeeded in creating false memories for associated, non-
presented, product attributes; when a product category was presented, false memories 
for non-exposed associated attributes were found. More interestingly, associative false 
memories were more likely for those high in NFC. False memories for attributes that 
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were not activated by prior exposure showed no difference as a function of NFC. 
Consequently, the difference between high and low NFC groups for associative false 
memories is not simply the result of a difference in response bias. True memory for 
presented attributes was also greater for those individuals high in NFC.  
Those high in NFC also retrieved more detailed true and false memories as 
measured by ‘Remember’ responses and process estimates of recollection. For true 
memory, this amounted to the more detailed recall of encoded information. For false 
memory, this related to the detailed recall of non-studied information. Effectively, 
those high in the NFC were more likely to retrieve studied and non-studied episodic-
like information.    
For know/familiarity based responses, the both proportion and process-based 
analyses indicated no effect of NFC or interaction. Only that ‘know’ responses and 
familiarity were higher for studied items. Thus, a dissociation between memory type 
(recollection vs. familiarity) as a function of NFC was observed and joins other 
similar dissociations reported in the literature (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002).  
At a general level, the explanation of the results can be framed in terms of 
previous theories. Thus, the presentation of product attribute information activated 
associated attributes that were not encoded (Roediger, et al., 2001; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995), or to the generation of a gist-based representation of the product 
category information (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). The relative merits of these accounts 
are assessed later, after the presentation of the results of Experiment 2.  
From the perspective of the current work, the most interesting finding is that, 
subjects’ high in NFC were more likely to produce associative false recognition 
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responses. In previous work, this has been described as the result of more elaborative 
encoding activities (Graham, 2007; Leding 2011; 2013). In terms of the ELM, this is 
deemed to occur through central route processing that can lead to more widespread 
activation of associative networks or the more likely extraction of a gist-based 
representation.  One way to examine if elaborative encoding processes are conducive 
to eliciting false memory is to directly manipulate processing orientation during 
encoding itself. Previous research has examined this by the use of a depth of 
processing manipulation and this is assessed in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 2. The effects of encoding task on consumer associative false 
memory 
Experiment 2 examined the idea that manipulating the nature of the encoding 
task can enhance both true and false associative consumer memory. Previous research 
has shown that more elaborative processing increases associative false memories 
(e.g., Thapar & McDermott, 2001; Toglia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999). Such 
experiments typically compare the outcome on memory of encoding tasks in which 
some stimuli are processed for meaning, whilst others are processed in terms of 
surface level features such as vowel judgements or item color.          
In the context of the current experiment, rather than instructing participants to 
consider the meaning of the words, a more consumer relevant task was used. 
Particularly, participants were given a purchase intention task (e.g., Burke & Srull, 
1988; Homer & Kahle, 1990; Mitchell, 1981) to perform during the encoding phase. 
Considering one’s purchase intention has been argued to lead to more elaborative 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           25 
 
 
 
processing and has been found to enhance consumer memory for advertised 
information (e.g., Burke & Srull, 1988; Homer & Kahle, 1990). 
Thus, in Experiment 2, one group of participants were presented with lists in 
the same manner as the first experiment, but asked to think about each attribute and 
consider the importance of that attribute when making a purchase decision. Another 
group of participants were given a non-elaborative task and asked to consider how the 
word sounded.  
Method 
Design 
The experiment had two independent variables. The first was encoding task 
(elaborative vs. non-elaborative) and was manipulated between-subjects. The second 
independent variable was attribute-type as in Experiment 1. The dependent variables 
were also the same as Experiment 1.  
Participants 
The participants were 80 individuals from the Manchester Metropolitan 
University. All took part on a voluntary basis and were recruited by experimental 
assistants via opportunity sampling.  
Materials & Apparatus 
The product-attribute lists, counterbalancing procedure, encoding sets and 
recognition tests were the same as Experiment 1. The only difference was that in this 
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experiment, counterbalancing took place over the two levels of the encoding task 
manipulation. Need for cognition was not measured in Experiment 2.  
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. The procedure followed that of 
Experiment 1 with the only difference being in the instructions given to the subjects 
during the encoding phase. Those assigned to the elaborative processing task, were 
asked to consider each attribute in terms of its importance with regard to making a 
purchase decision. Those assigned to the non-elaborative task were asked to think 
about the intonation and voicing of the attributes. Placement in these conditions was 
randomised. 
Results 
Overview 
The results are organised in the same manner as Experiment 1 covering, in 
order, the analyses of: overall proportion scores, signal detection measures, proportion 
analyses of RKG responses and process estimates of recollection and familiarity. 
Overall proportion yes responses 
A 2(encoding task; elaborative vs. non-elaborative) between-subjects by 
4(attribute type; studied vs. critical lure of studied vs. non-studied vs. critical lure of 
non-studied) within-subjects, mixed ANOVA was performed on the proportion 
scores. The descriptive statistics for these and other analyses for Experiment 2 can be 
found in Table 2. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
This produced an overall effect of attribute type, F(3, 234) = 241. 11, p < .001, 
p = .76. Inspection of the means show the lowest response rate to unstudied and 
unassociated items. The values for critical items was in-between the latter and studied 
information.  The effect of encoding task was significant, F(1, 78) = 5.44, p =. 02, p 
= .06. The interaction was also significant, F(3, 234) = 4.33, p = .01, p = .056. The 
interaction was examined by comparing between the levels of the encoding task for 
each type of attribute. This found a significant difference between the conditions for 
both true and critical items (t(78) = 2.09, p = .04, Cohen’s d = 0.47, and t(78) = 2.09, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.85, for true and critical attributes respectively). In both 
comparisons, the means were higher for the purchase intention task. The difference 
between the non-studied attributes was not significant, for either of the attribute types 
p’s > .05.  
Signal detection analyses 
The signal detection measures were calculated as in Experiment 1. These 
scores were entered into a 2(encoding task; elaborative vs. non-elaborative) between-
subjects by 2(memory type; true vs. false) within-subjects mixed ANOVA. The 
results revealed a significant main effect of memory type, F(1,78) = 33.74, p < .001, 
p = .30, showing higher discrimination accuracy for true memory. The main effect 
of encoding condition was also significant, F(1, 78) = 5.04, p = .03,p = .06, 
showing better discrimination for the elaborative condition. The interaction was non-
significant, F(1, 78) = 0.43, p = .51, p = .005.   
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Response bias score were skewed and analyses were based on log transformed 
scores as in Experiment 1. The analyses revealed a non-significant main effect of 
encoding task, F(1, 78) = 0.01, p = .92,p < .001, no effect of memory type, F(1, 78) 
= 0.82, p = .37, p = .01, and no interaction, F(1, 78) = 0.01, p = .92, p < .001.   
Proportion analyses for RKG responses 
Similar to Experiment 1, proportion responses for ‘Remember’, and ‘Know’ 
responses were analysed by separate 2(encoding task; elaborative vs. non-elaborative) 
between-subjects by 4(attribute type; studied vs. critical lure of studied vs. non-
studied vs. critical lure of non-studied) within-subjects mixed ANOVAs.  
For ‘Remember’ responses this produced a significant main effect of attribute 
type, F(3, 234) = 249.90, p < .001, p = .76. The effect of encoding task was 
significant, F(1, 78) = 3.82, p = .05, p = .47, showing more ‘Remember’ responses 
for the elaborative processing group. The interaction was not significant, F(3, 234) = 
1.13, p = .34, p = .01. As in Experiment 1, the main effect of attribute type was 
examined by comparing ‘equivalent’ attributes. Both comparisons revealed significant 
effects, t(79) = 18.84, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.61, for true memory and t(79) = 9.86, p 
< .001, Cohen’s d = 1.35, for false memory. In both instances, higher ‘Remember’ 
responses were related to either studied attributes or lures of studied lists.  
For ‘Know’ responses the main effect of attribute type was significant, F(3, 
234) = 10.04, p < .001, p = .11. The effect of encoding task was not significant, F(1, 
78) = 1.04, p = .31, p = .01. The interaction was not significant, F(3, 234) = 1.53, p 
= .21, p = .02. The main effect of attribute type indicated non-significant difference 
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for true memory, t(79) = 1.69, p = .10, Cohen’s d = 0.18, and a significant difference 
for false memory, t(79) = 5.32, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.70. 
The proportion of ‘Guess’ responses were not subject to analyses; the rationale 
for this was given in the results section of Experiment 1.   
Process estimates for recollection & familiarity
 Process estimates for recollection were placed into a 2(memory type; true vs. 
false) within-subjects by 2(encoding task; elaborative vs. non-elaborative) between-
subjects mixed ANOVA. The findings indicated a main effect of memory type, F(1, 
78) = 179.38, p < .001, p = .70, showing greater recollection estimates for true 
memory. The main effect of encoding task was not significant, F(1, 78) = 2.38, p = 
.12, p = .03, although the numerical value for the elaborative group was higher than 
the non-elaborative group. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 78) = 0.34, p = 
.56, p = .004.  
 Process estimates for familiarity were assessed by a similar ANOVA to 
recollection. This produced a non-significant effect of memory type, F(1, 78), = 0.08, 
p = .77,p = .001. The main effect of encoding task was not significant, F(1, 78) = 
2.55, p = .11,p = .03, and the interaction was not significant, F(1, 78) = 2.81, p = 
.10, p = .03. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 found that manipulating elaboration during encoding brought 
about similar effects to NFC. Principally, purchase intention (vs. sound judgements) 
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increased the proportion of both true and associative false memories. Like Experiment 
1, both true and associative false memories were typically accompanied by 
‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ responses as opposed to mere guessing. In addition, more 
elaborative encoding increased the number of ‘Remember’ responses, but not ‘Know’ 
responses. Process estimates for recollection were only numerically higher for the 
more elaborative task. Process estimates for familiarity did not show an effect of 
encoding task and thus resemble the effects of NFC in Experiment 1.    
General Discussion 
General overview & summary 
The experiments reported here demonstrated that false associative memories 
can be produced for non-presented, but associated product attributes. In both 
experiments, increasing the degree of elaboration led to higher true and associative 
false memories. In Experiment 1, this was achieved as a function of NFC. In 
Experiment 2, this was found by a direct manipulation of the encoding task. 
Increasing the degree of elaboration also enhanced the retrieval of specific episodic 
details as measured by ‘Remember’ responses. Irrespective of NFC and encoding 
task, associative false memories were comprised mainly of ‘Remember’ and ‘Know’ 
responses; indicating that consumer associative false memories may represent the 
outcome of both recollection and familiarity. Process estimates of recollection were 
greater for those high in NFC. Elaborative processing also produced a numerical 
increase in recollection in Experiment 2. Process estimates of familiarity were not 
influenced by either NFC or encoding task. More generally, a dissociation was found 
between remembering and knowing as a function of elaborative encoding. 
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These experiments exemplify the role of NFC and encoding tasks in the 
production of associative false memories, (e.g., Graham, 2007; Leding, 2011) and 
extends existing work in consumer false memory (Sherman, 2013; Sherman et al., 
2014). For NFC, this serves to clarify the nature and qualitative characteristics of false 
memory effects produced by this variable as first suggested, but not assessed, by 
Graham (2007). 
An inconsistency between the findings of Experiment 1 and those of Graham 
(2007) concerns true memory. Particularly, the current work found increased true 
recognition memory (as well as ‘remember’ responses) in high NFC subjects, whereas 
Graham (2007) found no difference as a function of NFC. There are a number of 
potential reasons for this discrepancy that could relate to both stimulus and strategy 
differences. With regard to the former, Graham made use of DRM lists, while the 
current experiments made use of lists that might be considered as taxonomic in nature. 
Differences in the effects of experimental variables have been found in previous 
research (e.g., Smith et al., 2002), and is likely due to differences in the backward 
associative strength between DRM and taxonomic lists. Consequently, the difference 
observed here might simply reflect this. Alternatively, subjects in the current 
experiments may have adopted different processing strategies. For example, because 
the current experiment made use of the remember-know procedure (as opposed to just 
old/new as did Graham), then retrieval strategies could have been altered, especially 
in high NFC subjects. As these are motivated to engage in effortful processing, the 
use of the remember-know procedure could have provided additional opportunities to 
deploy more demanding retrieval strategies. For example, a search for additional 
item-specific information that in turn would provide the basis for recollection and 
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‘Remember’ judgements (Rajaram, 1996; 1998). Of course, an assessment of this 
would require a direct comparison of overall recognition scores between conditions in 
which remember-know judgements are (vs. are not) required and remains for future 
work. However, irrespective of the precise reasons for the different outcomes of 
Graham (2007), and the current experiments, we would assert that the present results 
are consistent with the notion that NFC, like many experimental manipulations 
(e.g.,Craik & Tulving, 1975; Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner, et al., 1996; Rajaram, 1993; 
Thapar & McDermott, 2001), influences the degree of elaboration and therefore 
impacts upon true (as well as false) recognition memory.      
Theoretical accounts of the findings 
The false memory effects found here can be explained by reference to either 
activation-monitoring theory (Roediger et al., 1998; 2001), or FTT (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2005). Within the framework of the former, presentation of interrelated 
attributes leads to the activation of non-presented information. At test, this is 
mistakenly recognised as being presented because of a source monitoring error. With 
regard to FTT, encoding associated items leads to the creation of both a verbatim 
memory trace (for each item) and the extraction of a gist-based trace that represents a 
global summary of the presented information (in this instance, the product-attribute 
list). Associative false memories arise when the gist representation is used to respond 
to non-presented test items. The research presented here does not attempt to 
distinguish between these two accounts; however, it is worth considering how the 
effects of the principal variables (NFC and encoding task) can be accommodated 
within these frameworks.  
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To the extent that high (vs. low) NFC and encoding task (purchase intention 
vs. sound), correspond to variations in the degree of elaboration, this can be 
considered to lead to more widespread activation within product-attribute networks. 
Assuming equivalent source monitoring abilities between the conditions, this would 
lead to a greater number of false recognition errors at test. The nature of the 
activation/elaboration process could potentially reflect both controlled and automatic 
processing. It would seem that controlled processing undoubtedly plays an important 
role as those high in the NFC are motivated to engage in effortful and attentive 
thinking. In addition, the purchase intention manipulation required the conscious and 
deliberative processing of attributes during encoding.  
In both experiments, the finding that not only was true memory enhanced, but 
also ‘Remember’ responses is of importance. Firstly, controlled and elaborative 
processing enhances true memory, especially that associated with detailed 
remembering (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1994).  
Secondly, ‘Remember’ responses are often found to accompany associative false 
recognition errors and have been argued to be a function of controlled/conscious 
activation during encoding (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Gallo, 2006). Indeed, 
manipulations that enhance or limit controlled processing during encoding have been 
shown to increase or decrease the number of ‘Remember’ responses respectively (e.g., 
Dewhurst, Barry & Holmes, 2005).  
Neither NFC nor elaborative processing influenced the proportion of ‘Know’ 
responses. However, as noted earlier, such responses may underestimate the 
contribution of familiarity-based processing as contended by certain dual-process 
models in which recollection and familiarity act independently (Jacoby, 1998; 
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Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). However, process-estimates of 
familiarity showed a similar pattern of findings to the proportion ‘Know’ responses. 
Of course, this does not mean that familiarity-based processing plays no role in the 
results obtained here because a sizable proportion of ‘Know’ responses and process 
familiarity were found overall, regardless of the experimental manipulation. Both 
familiarity and knowing index the fact that the item lacks the detailed characteristics 
associated with recollection, and has been taken to indicate that this arises as a 
function of non-conscious automatic activation processes during encoding (e.g., 
Dewhurst et al., 2005; Knott & Dewhurst, 2007; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Seamon, et al., 1998). Consequently, some proportion of the false memories found 
here reflect the outcome of an automatic spreading activation mechanism.  
With regard to FTT, elaborative or deeper processing during encoding can 
serve to enhance the processing of global summary information across the list, and 
verbatim information (Brainerd & Renya, 2005). In the lists used here, global 
summary details could be the gist of particular product categories. Later, during 
testing, reliance on gist-based information would lead to false recognition errors that 
would be expected to be associated with ‘Know/familiarity’ responses. However, this 
was not found; rather, elaborative encoding was associated with enhanced memory for 
details. In particular, the increase in ‘Remember’ and recollection responses under 
elaborative processing conditions can be accounted for by the retrieval and use of 
verbatim representations. 
 Distinguishing between activation-monitoring and FTT is not always easy as 
both make similar predictions (Gallo, 2006). However, FTT makes the claim that gist 
representations are more resilient to decay over a retention interval, and thus false (vs. 
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true) memories should remain more stable over time (Brainerd, Payne, Wright, & 
Reyna, 2003). Experimental evidence exists to support this contention for both false 
recall and recognition (e.g., Seamon, et al., 2002; Thapar, & McDermott, 2001). Little 
work has been done on the effects of retention interval on consumer memory, 
however, one recent report found that false brand name memories increased over a 
delay of one week (Sherman, 2013). Such increases in false memory have been found 
on previous occasions (e.g., Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010), but 
remain to be more fully explored and explained in consumer settings.  
Broader implications for marketing and advertising 
Although the current research was directed primarily towards theoretical and 
experimental concerns, the findings do have broader implications. For example, 
advertisers, often by necessity, omit attribute information about a particular brand. 
Under such circumstances, consumers ‘fill in the gaps’ by deriving inferences about 
these (e.g., Kardes, et al., 2004). This has consequences for brand evaluation, 
especially when consumers are motivated to process information. For example by 
additional elaboration (e,g., McQuarrie, & Phillips, 2005; Sawyer & Howard, 1991). 
The current findings demonstrate consumers can develop false memories for attributes 
based on product class information. If this occurs for a specific brand, and these 
attributes are less valued than those of the actual brand (as might be expected if these 
are based largely on average prototypical features), then overall brand evaluations are 
likely to be lower. Consequently, marketing strategies should ensure that consumers 
do not have a reason to rely on product class information when specific brand 
attributes are clearly superior.  
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An additional implication derives from the above; if consumers develop false 
beliefs about brands based on product category attributes, then brands lose 
differentiation. Brand differentiation is considered to be of principal importance in 
marketing because it helps to minimise competition and make alternate brands less 
appropriate substitutes (e.g., Becerra, Santaló, & Silva, 2013; Caves & Williamson, 
1985; MacMillan & McGrath, 1997). Thus, the formation of (false) brand 
representations based on product class, could lead to fewer perceived differences 
between brands and increased competition. In addition, based on the findings reported 
here, elaborative processing could exacerbate this effect. Consequently, marketers 
need to concern themselves with ensuring that advertising promotes unique brand 
attributes (Cardello, et al., 2016). More generally, as noted in the introduction, if the 
consumer recalls associations based on the product category, but not the brand or 
marketing claims, the knowledge and evaluation of that brand may be biased. 
Accordingly, understanding the attributes activated by product categories is of 
importance.       
Potential limitations & future considerations 
The recognition task used in the present experiments comprised a greater 
number of distractors compared to studied targets. This is in contrast to many 
‘standard’ recognition tests that use equal numbers of targets and distractors and is 
often recommended as a guideline (Murdock, 1982). Variation in the number of 
targets to non-targets can result in variation in the false alarm rate (e.g., Dodson & 
Johnson, 1996), and could bias subjects to respond to some of the non-presented 
items. In spite of this, it is not uncommon in false memory research with associative 
lists to have unequal numbers of targets and distractors. For example, in a typical 
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DRM experiment, each list contributes one critical lure but multiple list items (e.g., 
Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, 2009; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Seamon, 
Lee, et al., 2002). Although presenting equal numbers of targets to non-targets seems 
ideal, it would also create another type of imbalance; it would mean having unequal 
numbers of each item-type.  Thus, the decision was made to use of equal numbers of 
each type of item. This was not considered to be particularly problematic as the 
results show clear differences between responses to the types of items (e.g., critical 
vs. noncritical lures) and this was of key importance in showing associative false 
memory effects.    
In Experiment 2, only one type of elaborative encoding task was used. This of 
course does not exhaust the range of potential tasks that could be relevant to consumer 
settings and processing objectives. These objectives shape where attention is 
allocated, and impact upon subsequent memory organisation and accessibility (Biehal, 
& Chakravarti, 1982; Burke & Srull, 1988; Wyer, Hung & Jiang, 2008). In addition, 
although those high in NFC are more likely to engage in elaborative processing, the 
exact nature of the encoding operations that they employ is much less clear. 
Accordingly, it will be important for future work to evaluate the impact of different 
processing objectives and what strategies are adopted spontaneously by those high in 
NFC.   
In both experiments, the primary dependent variables were memory-based. In 
consumer settings, although memory is important, consumers typically do not use 
memory as an end in itself, but as an input to judgement and decision making (e.g., 
Alba et al., 1991; Wyer, et al., 2008). Prior information about a brand or product has 
the potential to impact on choice judgements, even when the activation of attributes is 
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only incidental and non-conscious (e.g., Fitzsimons, Hutchinson, Williams, Alba, 
Chartrand, Huber, et al., 2002; Nedungadi, 1990; Yi, 1990).  Consequently, future 
work might want to consider whether associative activation, as observed in the current 
experiments, impact on measures beyond recognition performance. 
 Summary & conclusion 
 The research presented here found robust associative false consumer memory 
for product attributes. These effects were dependent upon variables known to be 
related to or elicit elaborative processing. Increases in false memory were also related 
to responses that index the retrieval of detailed episodic information. It is concluded 
that associative knowledge structures pertaining to product categories can assist with 
the retrieval of both studied and non-studied related information. The precise 
mechanisms and structures that support such effects likely involve a combination of 
controlled and conscious activation processes together with organised summary 
representations that could implicate gist or prototypes.  
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Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & Tormala, Z. L. (2004). Self-validation of cognitive 
responses to advertisements. Journal of Consumer Research,30, 559–573. 
Braun-LaTour, K. A., & LaTour, M. S. (2004). Assessing the long-term impact of a 
consistent advertising campaign on consumer memory. Journal of Advertising, 
33, 49-61. 
Brucks, M.  (1982).  The effects of product class knowledge on information search 
behaviour. Journal of Consumer Research, 12, 1-16. 
Burke, R. R. & Srull. T. K.  (1988). Competitive Interference and Consumer Memory 
for Advertising. Journal of Consumer Research, 15, 55-68. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, B. W. G. (1996). Dispositional 
differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying 
in need for cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 197-253. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           40 
 
 
 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need 
for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Morris, K. J. (1983). Effects of need for cognition on 
message evaluation, recall, and persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45, 805-818. 
Cardello, A. V., Pineau, B., Paisley, A. G., Roigard, C. M., Chheang, S. L., Guo 
Ellipsis, L. F., & Jaeger, S. R. (2016). Cognitive and emotional differentiators 
for beer: An exploratory study focusing on “uniqueness”. Food Quality and 
Preference, 54, 23–38. 
Caves, R. E., Williamson P. J.  (1985). What is Product Differentiation, Really? 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 34 (2), 113-132. 
Chang, C.  (2004).  The interplay of product class knowledge and trial experience in 
attitude formation. Journal of Advertising, 33, 83-92. 
Craik, F. I. M., & Tulving, E.  (1975).  Depth of processing and the retention of words 
in episodic memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 104, 268-
294. 
Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in 
immediate recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58(1), 17–22. 
doi:10.1037/h0046671 
Dewhurst, S. A., & Anderson, S. J. (1999). Effects of exact and category repetition in 
true and false recognition memory. Memory & Cognition, 27, 665-673. 
Dewhurst, S. A., Barry, C., & Holmes, S. J. (2005). Exploring the false recognition of 
category exemplars: Effects of divided attention and explicit generation. 
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 17, 803–819. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           41 
 
 
 
Dewhurst, S., Bould, E., Knott, L. & Thorley, C. (2009). The roles of encoding and 
retrieval processes in associative and categorical memory illusions. Journal of 
Memory & Language, 60, 154-164.  
Dewhurst, S. A., & Farrand, P. (2004). Investigating the phenomenological 
characteristics of false recognition for categorised words. European Journal of 
Cognitive Psychology, 16, 403-416. 
Diana, R., Yonelinas, A., Ranganath, C.  (2007). Imaging recollection and familiarity 
in the medial temporal lobe: a three-component model. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 11, 379–386. 
Dodson, C. S., & Johnson, M. K. (1996). Some problems with the process-
dissociation approach to memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 125, 181–194. 
Fehr, B., & Russell, J. A. (1984). Concept of Emotion Viewed from a Prototype 
Perspective. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 464-486. 
Fitzsimons, G, J. Hutchinson, W., Williams, P., Alba, J. W., Chartrand, T. L., Huber, 
J et al. (2002). Non-Conscious Influences on Consumer Choice. Marketing 
Letters, 13, 269–79. 
Fleischhauer, M., Miller, R., Enge, S., & Albrecht, T.  (2014). Need for cognition 
relates to low-level visual performance in a metacontrast masking paradigm. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 48, 45-50. 
Gallo, D. A.  (2006).  Associative illusions of memory: false memory research in 
DRM and related tasks. Hove: Psychology Press. 
Gallo, D. A. (2010). False memories and fantastic beliefs: 15 years of the DRM 
illusion. Memory & Cognition, 38, 833–848. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           42 
 
 
 
Gallo, D. A., & Lampinen, J. M. (2015). Three pillars of false memory prevention: 
orientation, evaluation, and corroboration. In J. Dunlosky, & S. K. Tauber 
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of metamemory (pp. 387-404). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gallo, D. A., & Roediger, H. L.  (2002).  Variability among word lists in eliciting 
memory illusions: evidence for associative activation and monitoring. Journal 
of Memory and Language, 47, 469–497 
Gallo, D. A., Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B. (2001). Associative false 
recognition occurs without strategic criterion shifts. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 8, 579–586. 
Gardiner, J. M.  (1988).  Functional aspects of recollective experience. Memory & 
Cognition, 16, 309 - 313. 
Gardiner, J. M., Gawlik, B., & Richardson-Klavehn, A.  (1994).  Maintenance 
rehearsal affects knowing, not remembering; elaborative rehearsal affects 
remembering, not knowing. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1, 107-110. 
Gardiner, J. M., Java, R. I., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (1996).  How levels of 
processing really influences awareness in recognition memory. Canadian 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 50, 114-122 
Gardiner, J. M., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2000). Remembering and knowing. In E. 
Tulving & F. I. M Craik (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 229–
244). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Graham, L. M. (2007). Need for cognition and false memory in the Deese-Roediger- 
McDermott paradigm. Personality and Individual Differences, 42, 409–418. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           43 
 
 
 
Hansen, H., Samuelsen, B. M., & Sallis, J. E. (2013). The moderating effects of need 
for cognition on drivers of customer loyalty. European Journal of Marketing, 
47, 1157–1176.doi:10.1108/03090561311324264 
Haugtvedt, C. P., Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T.  (1992).  Need for cognition and 
advertising: Understanding the role of personality variables in consumer 
behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1, 239-260. 
Hilbig, B. E. (2014). On the role of recognition in consumer choice: A model 
comparison. Judgment and Decision Making, 9, 51-57. 
Homer, P. M., & Kahle, L. R. (1990). Source expertise, time of source identification, 
and involvement in persuasion: An elaborative processing perspective. 
Journal of Advertising, 19, 30–39. 
Howe, M. L., Candel, I., Otgaar, H., Malone, C., & Wimmer, M. C. (2010). Valence 
and the development of immediate and long-term false memory illusions. 
Memory, 18, 58–75. 
Jacoby, L. L.  (1998).  Invariance in automatic influences of memory: Towards a 
users guide for the process dissociation procedure. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 24, 3-26. 
Jacoby, L. L., Begg, I. M., & Toth, J. P. (1997). In defense of functional 
independence: Violations of assumptions underlying the process-dissociation 
procedure? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 23(2), 484–495. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.23.2.484 
Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Shah, P., & Jonides, J. (2014). The role of individual 
differences in cognitive training and transfer. Memory & Cognition, 42, 464–
480. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-013-0364-z 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           44 
 
 
 
Kardash, C. M., & Noel, L. K. (2000). How organizational signals, need for 
cognition, and verbal ability affect text recall and recognition. Contemporary 
Educational Psychology, 25, 317–331. 
Kardes, F., Posavac, S., Cronley, M.   (2004). Consumer Inference: A Review of 
Processes, Bases, and Judgment Contexts. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
230-256. 
Knott, L. M., & Dewhurst, S. A. (2007). The effects of divided attention at study and 
test on false recognition: A comparison of DRM and categorized lists. Memory 
& Cognition, 35, 1954–1965. 
Leding, J. K.  (2011).  Need for cognition and false recall. Personality & Individual 
Differences, 51, 68-72. 
Leding, J. K. (2013). Need for cognition is related to the rejection (but not the 
acceptance) of false memories. The American Journal of Psychology, 126, 1-
10. 
Lee, A. Y.  (2002).  Effects of Implicit Memory on Memory-Based Versus Stimulus-
Based Brand Choice.  Journal of Marketing Research, 39, 440-454. 
Loken, B., & Ward, J. (1990). Alternative approaches to understanding the 
determinants of typicality. Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 111–126. 
Lohnas, L. J., Polyn, S. M., & Kahana, M. J. (2015). Expanding the scope of memory 
search: Modelling intralist and interlist effects in free recall. Psychological 
Review, 122, 337–363. 
MacMillan., I. C. & McGrath., R. G. (1997). Discovering new points of 
differentiation. Harvard Business Review, 75, (4), 113–145. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           45 
 
 
 
Maheswaran, D, Mackie, D. M, & Chaiken, S. (1992). Brand name as a heuristic cue: 
the effects of task importance and expectancy confirmation on consumer 
judgments. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1, 317–36. 
Mao, H., & Krishnan, H. S. (2006).  Effects of prototype and exemplar fit on brand 
extension evaluations: a two-process contingency model. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 3, 41–9. 
Martin, B. A. S., Lang, B., & Wong, S.  (2004). Conclusion Explicitness in 
Advertising: The Moderating Role of Need for Cognition and Argument 
Quality.  Journal of Advertising, 32, 57–65. 
McQuarrie, E. F., & Phillips, B. J.  (2005). Indirect Persuasion in Advertising: How 
Consumers Process Metaphors Presented in Pictures and Words.  Journal of 
Advertising, 34, 7-20. 
Migo, E. M., Mayes, A. R., & Montaldi, D.  (2012). Measuring recollection and 
familiarity: improving the remember/know procedure. Conscious & 
Cognition, 21, 1435–1455. 
Mitchell, A. A.  (1981). The dimensions of advertising involvement. In K. Monroe 
(Ed) Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 8, (pp. 25-30). Ann Arbor, MI: 
Association for Consumer Research. 
Murdock, B. B. (1982). Recognition memory. In C. R. Puff (Ed.), Handbook of 
research methods in human memory and cognition (pp. 1-26). New York: 
Academic Press.  
Nedungadi, P.  (1990).  Recall and consumer consideration sets: Influencing choice 
without altering brand evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 263-
276. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           46 
 
 
 
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., & Tormala, Z. L.  (2002). Thought confidence as a 
determinant of persuasion: The self validation hypothesis. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 82: 722-741. 
Petty, R.E. & Cacioppo, J.T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and 
contemporary approaches. Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and 
peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Petty, R.E., Cacioppo, J.T., & Goldman, R. (1981). Personal involvement as a 
predictor of 
argument-based persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 
847-855. 
Petty, R. E., Ostrom, T. M., & Brock, T. C.  (1981). Historical Foundations of the 
Cognitive Response Approach to Attitudes and Persuasion, in R. E. Petty, T 
M. Ostrom, & T C. Brock (Eds), Cognitive Responses in Persuasion (pp 5-
29). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 5–29. 
Priester, J. R., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Source attributions and persuasion: Perceived 
honesty as a determinant of message scrutiny. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 21, 637-654. 
Rajaram, S. (1993). The components of recollective experience: Remembering and 
knowing. Memory & Cognition, 21, 89-102. 
Rajaram, S. (1996). Perceptual effects on remembering: Recollective pro- 
cesses in picture recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22, 365–377. 
Rajaram, S. (1998). The effects of conceptual salience and perceptual distinctiveness 
on conscious recollection. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5, 71-78. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           47 
 
 
 
Ranganath, C. (2010). A unified framework for the functional organization of the 
medial temporal lobes and the phenomenology of episodic memory. 
Hippocampus, 20, 1263–1290. 
Rao, A. R., & K. B. Monroe.  (1988). The Moderating Effect of Prior Knowledge on 
Cue Utilization in Product Evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 15, 
253–64. 
Richardson-Klavehn, A., Gardiner, J. M., & Java, R. I.  (1996).  Memory: Task 
dissociations, process dissociations, & dissociations of consciousness. In G. 
Underwood (Ed), Implicit Cognition (pp. 85-158). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Roediger, H. L., & McDermott, K. B.  (1995).  Creating false memories: 
Remembering words not presented on lists. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 21, 803 - 814. 
Roediger, H. L., McDermott, K. B., & Robinson, K. (1998). The role of associative 
processes in creating false memories. In M. Conway, S. Gathercole, & C. 
Cornoldi (Eds.), Theories of memory Vol. 2, (pp. 187-245). New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Roediger, H. L., III, Watson, J. M., McDermott, K. B., & Gallo, D. A. (2001). Factors 
that determine false recall: A multiple regression analysis. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 8, 385–407. 
Rosch, E. (1973). Natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 4, 328-350. 
Rosch, E. (1978). “Principles of Categorization.” In E. Rosch and B.B. Lloyd (Eds.), 
Cognition and Categorization (pp. 27-48). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           48 
 
 
 
Sawyer, A. G., & Howard, D. J. (199).  Effects of omitting conclusions in 
advertisements to Involved and uninvolved audiences, Journal of Marketing 
Research, 28, 467-474. 
Schacter, D. L.  (1999).  The seven sins of memory: insights from psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience. American  Psychologist, 54, 182 - 203. 
Schacter, D. L., Israel, L., & Racine, C.  (1999).  Suppressing false recognition in 
younger and older adults: The distinctiveness heuristic. Journal of Memory & 
Language, 40, 1-24. 
Schmitt, B.  (2012).  The consumer psychology of brands. Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 22, 7-17. 
Seamon, J. G., Lee, I. A., Toner, S. K., Wheeler, R. H., Goodkind, M.S., & Birch, A. 
D. (2002). Thinking of critical words during study is unnecessary for false 
memory in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott procedure. Psychological 
Science, 13, 526-531. 
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., & Gallo, D. A. (1998). Creating false memories of words 
with or without recognition of list items: Evidence for non-conscious 
processes. Psychological Science, 9, 20–26. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00004 
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., Kopecky, J. J., Price, C. A., Rothschild, L., Fung, N. S., & 
Schwartz, M. A. (2002). Are false memories more difficult to forget than 
accurate memories? The effect of retention interval on recall and recognition. 
Memory & Cognition, 30, 1054-1064. 
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., Schlegel, S. E., Greene, S. E., & Goldenberg, A. B. (2000). 
False memory for categorized pictures and words: The category associates 
procedure for studying memory errors in children and adults. Journal of 
Memory & Language, 42, 120–146. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           49 
 
 
 
Sherman, S. M. (2013). False recall and recognition of brand names increases over 
time. Memory, 21, 219-229. 
Sherman, S. M., Follows, H., Mushore, A., Hampson-Jones, K., and Wright-Bevans., 
K.  (2014).  Television advertisements create false memories for competitor 
brands, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4, 1-7. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.06.001 
Smith, S. M., Gerkens, D. R., Pierce, B. H., & Choi, H. (2002). The roles of 
associative responses at study and semantically guided recollection at test in 
false memory: The Kirkpatrick and Deese hypothesis. Journal of Memory & 
Language, 47, 436-447. 
Stayman, D. M., & Kardes, E R. (1992). Spontaneous inference processes in 
advertising: Effects of need for cognition and self-monitoring on inference 
generation and utilization. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 1, 125-142. 
Teichert, T., A. & Schöntag, K.  (2010).  Exploring consumer knowledge structures 
using associative network analysis. Psychology & Marketing, 27, 369-98. 
Thapar, A., McDermott, K. B.  (2001).  False recall and false recognition induced by 
presentation of associated words: Effects of retention interval and level of 
processing. Memory & Cognition, 29, 424 - 432. 
Toglia, M. P., Neuschatz, J. S., & Goodwin, K. A. (1999). Recall accuracy and 
illusory memories: when more is less. Memory, 7, 233–256. 
Wixted, J. T., & Mickes, L.  (2010). A continuous dual-process model of 
remember/know judgments. Psychological Review, 117, 1025–1054. 
Wootan, S, S., & Leding, J. K.  (2015). Need for Cognition and false memory; Can 
one’s natural processing style be manipulated by external factors. American 
Journal of Psychology, 128, 459-468. 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           50 
 
 
 
Wyer, R. S., Hung, I. W., & Jiang, Y.  (2008).  Visual and verbal processing strategies 
in comprehension and judgment. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 18, 244-
257. 
Yi, Y.  (1990).  The effects of contextual priming in print ads. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 17, 215-222. 
Yonelinas, A. P.  (2002).  The nature of recollection and familiarity: A review of 30 
years of research. Journal of Memory & Language, 46, 441-517. 
Yonelinas, A. P., Aly, M., Wang., W., & Koen, J.  (2010).  Recollection and 
familiarity: examining controversial assumptions and new directions. 
Hippocampus, 20, 1178-1194. 
Yonelinas, A. P., & Jacoby, L. L.  (1995). The relation between remembering and 
knowing as bases for recognition: Effects of size congruency. Journal of 
Memory & Language, 34, 622-643. 
 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           51 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
1. The stimulus sets were created by making use of a multistage procedure that 
involved initial generation and ranking of attributes followed by a relevance 
rating task. The reasoning behind this reflected our appraisal of the research 
literature on both false memory and categorisation. Associative word lists such 
the DRM sets were developed based on free -association procedures (e.g., 
Gallo & Roediger, 2002), with list items possessing a strong backward 
associative strength to the critical lures. Other types of lists, such as those 
employed in the category-repetition procedure are based on pre-existing 
taxonomic categories. In categorization research, the strength of relationship 
between exemplars from a category and the category name can also be judged 
by association norms but other procedures involve rating the relevance of 
exemplars to category labels or prototypes (e.g., Fehr, & Russell, 1984; Rosch, 
1973; 1978). This procedure has also been used in consumer psychology to 
assess relatedness between products/brands and attributes (e.g., Loken, & 
Ward, 1990; Mao & Krishnan, 2006). Consequently, we adopted a hybrid 
approach to the development of the stimulus sets that capitalised initially on 
item generation followed by relevance ratings. 
 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           52 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Sets of product classes and attributes used in Experiments 1 and 2. Bold-underlined 
are the product classes, bold are the critical lures and normal font are the list words. 
Chocolate: cocoa, bar, dark, Belgium, melting, nut & raisin, smooth, bitter; Tea: 
hot, bags, leaf, brewed, traditional, British, herbal, iced; Soft Drink: fizzy, can, 
bottled, carbonated, refreshing, diet, energising, artificial; Pet Food: meaty, chunky, 
tinned, jelly, fish, moist, foiled, marrowbone; Cereal: breakfast, crunchy, bowl, 
flakes, fibre, grain, oats, morning: Washing Detergent: clean, laundry, biological, 
powder, softening, conditioning, linen, colour care; Cheese:  mature, mild, strong, 
hard, creamy, spreadable, crumbly, pungent; Television: flatscreen, high-definition, 
plasma, LCD, clear, sound, portable, contrast; Glove: warm, winter, woollen, 
protective, padded, boxing, mitten, driving; Chair: comfortable, sit, lounge, office, 
sofa, fabric, cushion, headrest; Milk:  dairy, calcium, cow, skimmed, farm, whole, 
shake, baby; Soap:  hand, cleansing, antibacterial, liquid, lather, fragrant, 
moisturising, face: Juice:  fruity, cold, quenching, fresh, pure, squeezed, concentrate, 
cordial; Pen: biro, writing, fountain, ink, roller ball, marker, paper, click; 
Toothpaste:  minty, whitening, fluoride, strengthening, sensitive, plaque, stripy; 
Candy: sugary, sweet, tasty, colourful, chewy, tangy, boiled, sour; Bread: loaf, 
brown, white, sandwich, crust, flour, bun, soft; Bed: sleep, double, king, relaxing, 
queen, bunk, four post, water; Sausage: pork, butcher, hotdog, grill, camp, mash, 
cocktail, smoked; Deodorant: antiperspirant, scented, spray, sweat, hygienic, roll-
on, exercise, sport.  
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TABLE 1 
           Mean proportion (and SE) of measure type as a function of need for cognition and response 
measure. 
 
             Need for Cognition 
 
 
 Response Measure     Low           High 
      
 
     Overall Proportion Measure 
Proportion Attribute Type 
  Studied    0.48 (0.03)  0.65 (0.03) 
  Critical Lure   0.32 (0.03)  0.43 (0.04) 
  Non-Studied   0.15 (0.02)  0.14 (0.02) 
  Critical of Non-studied  0.19 (0.02)  0.20 (0.02) 
      
Signal Detection Measure 
Signal Detection Measure 
d’ True    1.09 (0.12)  1.68 (0.14) 
  d’ False    0.41 (0.09)  0.79 (0.12) 
  Log β  True   0.69 (0.13)  0.48 (0.13) 
  Log β  False   0.28 (0.08)  0.34 (0.09) 
     
Proportion RKG Measure 
Remember Responses 
Studied    0.25 (0.03)  0.48 (0.03) 
  Critical Lure   0.14 (0.02)  0.27 (0.04) 
  Non-Studied   0.06 (0.01)  0.04 (0.01) 
  Critical of Non-studied  0.07 (0.08)  0.08 (0.01) 
 
Know Responses 
Studied    0.16 (0.02)  0.18 (0.02) 
  Critical Lure   0.12 (0.01)  0.14 (0.02) 
  Non-Studied   0.04 (0.01)  0.06 (0.01) 
  Critical of Non-studied  0.06 (0.01)  0.06 (0.01) 
 
Guess Responses 
Studied    0.07 (0.02)  0.03 (0.01) 
  Critical Lure   0.06 (0.01)  0.03 (0.01) 
  Non-Studied   0.05 (0.01)  0.03 (0.01) 
  Critical of Non-studied  0.07 (0.01)  0.05 (0.01) 
      
Process Estimate Measure 
 Process Recollection 
  True    0.19 (0.03)  0.40 (0.04) 
  False    0.08 (0.02)  0.19 (0.04) 
 
Process Familiarity  
 True    0.33 (0.02)  0.40 (0.04) 
 False    0.21 (0.02)  0.26 (0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
Associative False Consumer Memory                                           55 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
           Mean proportion (and SE) of measure type as a function of encoding task and response measure. 
 
       Encoding Task 
 
 
 Response Measure    Low Elaboration           High Elaboration 
      
 
     Overall Proportion Measure 
Proportion Attribute Type 
  Studied    0.60 (0.03)  0.67 (0.03) 
  Critical Lure   0.36 (0.02)  0.47 (0.02) 
  Non-Studied   0.24 (0.03)  0.23 (0.03) 
  Critical of Non-studied  0.18 (0.02)  0.22 (0.02) 
      
Signal Detection Measure 
Signal Detection Measure 
d’ True    1.05 (0.12)  1.34 (0.12) 
  d’ False    0.62 (0.06)  0.80 (0.07) 
  Log β  True   0.39 (0.08)  0.37 (0.12) 
  Log β  False   0.45 (0.07)  0.45 (0.08) 
     
Proportion RKG Measure 
Remember Responses 
Studied    0.43 (0.03)  0.48 (0.03) 
  Critical Lure   0.14 (0.02)  0.19 (0.02) 
  Non-Studied   0.06 (0.02)  0.06 (0.02) 
  Critical of Non-studied  0.04 (0.01)  0.06 (0.01) 
 
Know Responses 
Studied    0.10 (0.01)  0.13 (0.02) 
  Critical Lure   0.12 (0.01)  0.16 (0.01) 
  Non-Studied   0.09 (0.02)  0.08 (0.01) 
  Critical of Non-studied  0.08 (0.01)  0.08 (0.01) 
 
Guess Responses 
Studied    0.07 (0.01)  0.06 (0.01) 
  Critical Lure   0.10 (0.01)  0.11 (0.01) 
  Non-Studied   0.09 (0.02)  0.08 (0.01) 
  Critical of Non-studied  0.06 (0.01)  0.07 (0.01) 
      
Process Estimates Measure  
 Process Recollection 
  True    0.36 (0.02)  0.41 (0.03)  
  False    0.10 (0.01)  0.13 (0.02) 
 
Process Familiarity 
 True    0.30 (0.03)  0.32 (0.03) 
 False    0.26 (0.02)  0.34 (0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
